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Introduction
Scientists carry out the tasks of education, research and commercial activities (the third task) at universities. Despite their importance, the roles, motivations and perceptions of university inventors have been relatively neglected topics of study. Most studies on university-industry relations have hitherto focused on a few selected elite universities, technology transfer offices (TTOs), patent legislations, or technology transfer activities in specific sectors from the United States. In these studies, the focus of interest is primarily the importance of institutions (patent legislation, policy mechanisms) and organizations (TTOs, university administration) A number of studies (see among others Bercovitz and Feldman 2004; Gulbrandsen 2005; Giuri et al. 2006; Meyer 2005; Azoulay et al. 2007; Baldini et al. 2007 ; Goktepe forthcoming) have recently paid attention to the roles of individual inventors in the university-industry technology transfer or academic entrepreneurship. In line with these recent developments, this research aims to focus on three factors of interest; namely scientists' internal factors (e.g. human and scientific capital), external factors (directorsresearch group leader behaviour, spin-offs at the institute.) and psychological factors (perceptions, motivations) . Within the scope of this paper we specifically focus on the relationship between the likelihood of scientists' patenting and inventing behaviours and their perception and presumptions on the benefits (measured in terms of financial benefits and/or scientific reputation) of commercial activities. We control for different sociodemographic as well as institutional factors and scientific fields in our analysis. For this purpose we use a unique database developed recently at the Max Planck Institute of Economics on the commercialisation activities of over 2500 scientists spanning over 60 different institutes constituting the Max Planck Society for Advancement of Sciences (hereafter referred to as MPG).
Using discrete choice models on patenting and invention disclosure to the MPG, we find that it is not money that influences these decisions rather it is reputation/fame that drives scientists to both patent and disclose their inventions. Scientists' commercialization activities do not necessarily respond to monetary expectations. This confirms the assertions made by Long (2002) that patenting is basically an information transfer mechanism and patentees use patents not always for the expected financial benefits by excluding others but for the non-monetary benefits that accrue due to the information conveyed. Patenting activities could, to a certain extent, be independent from private economic incentives. This finding is important because it means that the academic capitalism is not essentially warranted. However this does not mean that the design of intellectual property rights, other forms of incentives, in academic organizations would not have real effects on economic growth and productivity.
The paper is organised as follows, the following section deals with the question of why scientists patent and disclose their inventions and takes the view of patents as signals that scientists use. In the third section, perceptions and motivations of scientists are shed light upon and propositions are put forward after which in the fourth section the new dataset is introduced along with the variables of interest and methodology. The fifth section puts forward the estimation results and analysis and sixth concludes.
Why do Scientists make Invention Disclosures and Patent?
By the nature of their work scientists constantly ask research questions and aim to show their research results in a timely fashion among their peers to achieve reputation and recognition (Merton 1957) . On the other hand, research results of scientists sometimes lead to invention disclosures and patents which bring the economic incentives and pecuniary rewards into the picture. The standard expectation is that patenting is an essentially economic phenomenon. It is almost generally believed that any invention would barely come out of a human's brain if that human did not have the possibility to earn all or part of the stream of economic rents that results from the industrial Jena Economic Research Papers 2008-032 exploitation of his or her invention, a preliminary condition for that being that he or she ought to own a propriety right (usually a patent) over that invention (Schmookler 1966) .
Inventive activity -along with technological change and the production of scientific and technical knowledge-was later on argued as something that was independent of economic needs and motivations (Rosenberg 1974) . More recent empirical findings also show that to some extent it is easier to accept that research and thus patenting is a matter of doing something professionally satisfying and rewarding (Gulbrandsen 2005; Giuiri et al. 2006; Baldini 2007; Goktepe forthcoming) .
In line with these arguments, it is of particular interest to understand what matters for scientists to disclose their inventions to authorities and patent. Is it due to the perception of gaining reputation and free from pecuniary rewards? Yet, the question here becomes a little bit more complicated when we consider if the aim is to gain reputation and scientific visibility, why do scientists bother and patent instead of choosing the usual scientific publication route. We therefore alternatively pose, aligning with the classical economists may argue, scientists' patenting activities might be different from their research activities and they are also motivated by pecuniary rewards in their patenting activities. The underlying model can be formulated as follows:
Patenting/disclosure Activity=f (motivations, age, gender, citizenship, career experience, research milieu) A further piece to this puzzle can be added by introducing if there is any significant difference regarding reputation and financial rewards between the scientists who patented and who had only disclosed their inventions to their employees. Inventing and patenting are two separable phenomena. It is accepted that not every invention can be patentable, In what follows we develop the principal arguments of this paper. We revisit some of the recent studies on the role of patents and why scientists patent. However such findings merit further examination since they have been based on smaller samples or limited to a few selected universities or specific disciplines.
Patents as Signals
While many study why firms patent (for example -Horstmann et al. 1985) , very few studies concentrate on why do 'individuals' patent. We tend to emphasize this due to the reason that benefits/costs that patents provide to firms might not be the same as for the individuals. Individual decision making is complex and one needs to first understand the specific functions that a patent provides to individuals. Common knowledge prevails that patenting is a mechanism to 'privatise' information by excluding others to the intellectual property. At the same time, through the channel of patenting documentation, an individual may actually reveal the invention process. This however does not happen. Anton and Yao (2004) find that many of the patents do not actually reveal complete information on the invention process, therefore leading to "little patents-big secrets". So with this finding it seems plausible that monetary benefits to patents can be still assured, without a danger to the knowledge underlying the invention process. But do all individuals patent just because they want money by excluding others? Fame and money have always been the ultimate passions of humans mainly due to their effectiveness, their power to lure others and their pervasive nature. The want for fame and money have always been omnipresent, in some cases omnipotent too. While we discussed about the monetary gains from patents, an equally intriguing gain is reputation. Since we are interested in individuals, reputation seems to be another interest that would drive them to act on different things.
In order to be reputable, in the first place, information has to be conveyed about the person in context. In this view, a scientist can be thought of conveying 'his type' (highly productive-low productive) to specifically two or more groups of people. One major group would be the compatriots in the research field concerned while another can be the employer. To the first group, scientists have three ways to convey information about their type -either publish, or patent, or do both. To the second group one specific channel would be to report their findings officially-meaning-disclose their invention to the employer on an official basis 1 . In this paper we focus on the channels of patenting and invention disclosure. Both of these can be viewed as information transfer mechanisms, not necessarily for monetary gains but for the non-monetary benefits (Long 2002 ) -in our case, reputation-that the individual foresees to be accrued. Individuals therefore would resort to actions that signal their type by conveying the right information to the concerned group.
Although Long (2002) as well as the earlier studies by Schmookler (1966) and Rosenberg 
Perceptions & Motivations of Scientists
In this section we mainly focus on the question, what are the perceptions and motivations of scientists and their relation to commercial activities. To begin with we tip our hand with three basic assumptions that may motivate scientists to engage in research and commercial activities (Stephan and Levin 1992) . (i) An interest in solving the puzzle; (ii) an interests for recognition and prestige among peers; (iii) an interest in achieving economic gains.
Solving the Research Puzzle:
Puzzle-solving involves a fascination for the research process itself (Stephan et al. 2005) . The puzzle-solving nature of research is described by the historian of science, Robert Hull (1988 in Stephan et al. 2005) . In addition to
Mertonian norms 2 (see Merton 1973) ; there is considerable evidence that scientists have a desire for inventing (Stern 2004) . Scientists at universities are intrinsically motivated to do research. Much of the incentive to invent comes from the joy of solving research questions (Hagstrom 1965; Levin and Stephan 1991; Stephan 1996) . Thus they are intrinsically motivated to conduct research, quite apart from the ability to earn financial rents from their effort (Hellmann 2007).
Recent empirical studies have also confirmed that the innate curiosity of scientists make them research that can be publishable. Gulbrandsen (2005) Consistently these studies although limited in scope found that personal satisfaction and doing something professionally enjoyable were important reasons for scientists to be involved in commercialization. They found that social and personal rewards (i.e. the fact that the innovation might increase the performance of the organization where the inventor works), personal satisfaction to show that something is technically possible, and prestige /reputation) were considered by the inventors to be more important than other types of compensation like monetary rewards and career advancement.
Social and Personal Rewards:
In addition to curiosity-driven research, scientists are motivated to achieve reputation and recognition among their peers in a timely fashion (Merton 1957) . Scientists are motivated by rewards of recognition and prestige among peers, and they have a strong interest in winning the game. Patenting can enhance the prestige and increase the scientific productivity of the scientists by reaffirming the novelty and usefulness of their research Powell 2001, 2003 Siegel et al. (2003) concluded that organizational factors, in particular scientists' reward systems and technology transfer office compensation, influence the productivity of the technology transfer activities and thus the motivations of scientists to disclose their inventions. Bercovitz and Feldman (2004) assumed that faculty members would be responsive to financial incentives and that there would be a direct relationship between licensing royalty distribution rates and the amount of technology transfer across universities. Thursby et al. (2001) and Lach and Schankerman (2003) provided empirical evidence that milestone payments and share of license revenues from their inventions are positively related to the motivations of inventors to patent. Markman et al. (2004) investigated the relationship between entrepreneurial activities and payments to scientists, departments and TTO staff. They argued that scientists and their departments will be unlikely to disclose or participate in technology transfer activities unless they are given proper incentives to do so. They expect licensing revenues from technology transfer activities can motivate scientists and their departments towards entrepreneurial activities given the scarcity of resources on research. Based on the arguments posed until now, we frame the following propositions for empirical testing. Since we do not make a case for only reputation or only money drives patenting, we test several possibilities in terms of methodology. Apart from these specific propositions we also test several individual and external (institution specific) factors that affect patenting and invention disclosure decision.
Propositions
• Scientists who expect high reputation are more likely to use both mechanisms (patenting and invention disclosure)
• Patenting and Invention disclosure need not be necessarily driven by monetary interests.
Individual & External Factors
The group of studies that focuses on individuals is inspired partly by psychology and behavioural sciences. These studies have focused on the socio-demographic characteristics of inventors. Macdonald 1984 Macdonald , 1986 Sirili 1987; Amesse et al. 1990; Klofsten and Jones-Evans 2000; Giuri et al. 2006 investigated the characteristics, background and socio-demographic features of inventors. The socio-demographic findings of these different studies are fairly consistent (see also Azoulay et al.2007 ).
Inventors were most often men; the average age being between 45 and 48. They were highly educated and had technical and commercial knowledge and had experience above the average.
Stephan and Levin (2005) investigated whether personal characteristics, age (life-cycle), citizenship status, gender and receipt of federal funding were related to patenting behaviours. They found little evidence of age effects, yet they found that tenured scientists are more likely to patent than non-tenured ones (Levin and Stephan 1991; Stephan 1996) . Women patent less than men, although the effect is smaller since the number of women employed in universities relative to men is low. Scientists who think the costs of commercialization, e.g. patent applications, fees associated with starting a business, are very high will be less likely to get involved in entrepreneurial activities or patenting. Faculty decisions towards technology transfer are shaped by the institutional and organizational environments which are supportive or oppositional for university-industry technology transfer. It is therefore necessary to control for scientists' perception on the role of agents such as technology transfer offices.
Data Characteristics, Variables of Interest and Methodology
This paper is based on a large-scale survey of over 2500 scientists in Germany aimed at obtaining information about the commercialization activities. Since our main propositions are on reputation and money there are many ways that we could measure it. The questionnaire proved helpful at this stage since scientists were asked whether they expect commercialisation (patenting results, research collaboration with private sector, consulting services etc.) to increase their reputation basing on a 5 point scale. In the same vein, the question on whether they expect commercialisation to make money was asked. Using these two measures we constructed variables -high money, high reputation if the respondents strongly agree with the prospects of getting money, or getting reputation.
Since our interest was also to cover the demographic nature of the respondents, we have used age, gender (female or not), foreign-born scientist variables. These cover the aspects 'internal' to the scientists. We further utilize data on their industry experience, MPG experience, the position (whether a director, a group leader, a post doctoral fellow), and which field of science do they belong. In order to clearly track the patenting and invention disclosure behaviour one has to also account for the personal opinions of the scientists with respect to the nature and mode of commercialisation. Scientists were therefore asked if they want their research to be open (free from exclusion) and if they think a technology transfer office (TTO) is indeed needed to take their research to industry or commercialise it in any other fashion. We utilise this information in order to account for the personal opinion of scientists about commercialisation in general that may affect their actual commercialisation behaviour. The following section puts forward some statistics indicating on the nature of data, the variables considered and the estimation results from the multinomial logit model.
Estimation Results & Analysis
After the necessary inclusions and exclusions for the paper we had almost 1100 usable responses. Out of this sample, 110 scientists reported only patenting, 99 reported only disclosure and 187 reported both patenting and disclosure. Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics on the variables we consider. It can be clearly seen that most of the scientists take both paths of patenting and invention disclosure, but only few of them do it for money. It's also interesting to see that scientists who consider their research to be freely available for everyone also patent and disclose inventions to MPG. The mean ages for every mechanism is around 40 while less than a quarter of scientists patenting, disclosing or doing both, is female. Almost half of the foreign-born scientists patent and the number is almost the same for disclosure, but lesser for both.
Directors certainly seem to show a very high patenting and disclosing behaviour, if not for each of them individually. There is almost an equal share of scientists patenting in the broad fields of biology and medicine compared to chemistry, physics and other technical subjects. Post-docs and group leaders seems to show very high patenting and disclosure behaviour. This may be due to their young age that they are needed to show performance mainly after PhD and therefore they might be more active in inventing and patenting.
Given this scenario, we tested a multinomial logit model where all the three categories (only patent, only disclose, both patent and disclose) are considered. Table 2 provides the estimation results. 5 Based on our estimation results we can observe that the scientists who expect high reputation from commercialisation activities are more likely to perform both patenting as well as invention disclosure. This confirms our first hypothesis that scientists who expect high reputation are more likely to use both mechanisms. It can be interpreted as the scientists who would expect to have high reputation would signal it through patenting and disclosing their invention to reach the relevant audience who receive the signal. Secondly, we can see the effect is so strong that if scientists want reputation they do not necessarily take any one of the paths, but are very highly likely to take both.
Is money driving the patenting and invention disclosure behaviour then? The answer seems to be no. As can be seen in Table 2 scientists in fact are less likely to take any of the three paths if their motivation is to gain money. The alternative path may be viewed as starting up for firms, consultancy, or just keeping it as secret for future monetary gains.
This however, we did not explicitly test, but we can confirm our second hypothesis that patenting and invention disclosure need not be necessarily driven by monetary interests.
It is indeed reputation that drives these two and scientists may view reputation as more important than money. Academic interests might be of more value to the scientists than Another interesting result is on the position variable. As a sequential process-the postdoc seem to be more likely to patent, the group leader is more likely to only disclose or take both paths, and the director would be more likely to only choose both paths. This might be possible due to the experience that each of these persons have by understanding the rules, regulations and institutional culture of the MPG (i.e. existence of organizational ownership of patents and an active TTO since 1970s). It is as well as due to the fact that the personal responsibilities towards disclosing inventions may grow over time. This is confirmed by the MPG experience variable, that scientists having higher number of years with the MPG are more likely to disclose their inventions to the MPG.
On the demographics-it is interesting to notice that foreign born scientists are more likely to choose both paths rather than only one of them, older scientists are more likely to patent and choose both paths rather than only disclose their inventions. Scientists with higher industry experience are more likely to disclose their inventions.
Scientists in the field of biology and medicine, seemingly a very vibrant field with respect to inventions and patenting, are more likely to choose both patenting and invention disclosure. Being female is insignificant, which was expected since patenting and invention disclosure are indeed norms and practices of scientists in general and may not be particularly gender specific.
Discussion & Concluding Remarks
In this paper we are inspired by the tension whether the traditional assumption that financial rewards (gaining monopoly powers /exclusivity) are the main driving forces of inventing and patenting decisions of scientists. Or scientists' inventing and patenting activities are related to their traditional academic concerns, i.e. gaining reputation and visibility. As we introduced in earlier, this tension has been long debated in the literature especially in the context of industrial knowledge creation, protection, research and development (see Schmookler 1966; Rosenberg 1974; Eisenberg 1989; Nelson 1990, 1994; Long 2002; Cohen 2005; Thursby and Thursby 2007) . We discussed this tension (money or fame) within the context of academic knowledge creation and research from the perceptions of scientists and their decisions to make inventions disclosures and patenting. Instead of making a case for or against one factor, we investigated both aspects. By doing so, we move beyond the traditional argumentation of financial incentives matter for inventing activities for academic scientists. This paper thus also contributed to the debate on the role of IPR and commercial activities at the universities and public research organizations.
Empirically we show that scientists who have more expectations to gain scientific reputation and visibility will more likely to patent. On the other hand scientists' commercialization activities do not necessarily respond to monetary expectations. By the same token, scientists' inventing activities are also related to their expectations of recognition and reputation while financial benefits are less important. Specifically, the scientists who expect high reputation from commercialisation activities are more likely to perform both patenting as well as invention disclosure. This confirms our first hypothesis that scientists who expect high reputation are more likely to use both mechanisms. It can be interpreted as the scientists who would expect to have high reputation would signal it through patenting and disclosing their invention to reach the relevant audience who receive the signal.
On the other hand, scientists in fact are less likely to take any of the three paths if their motivation is to gain money. Invention disclosure and patenting activities could to a certain extent be independent from private economic incentives. It can be clearly seen that most of the scientists take both paths of patenting and invention disclosure, but only few of them do it for money. It's also interesting to see that scientists who consider their research to be freely available for everyone patent and disclose inventions to a lesser extent.
These findings are also important because it means that the academic capitalism is not The opinion based questions report numbers that respond to "highly agree and strongly agree" in the 5 point scale. All others are particular numbers that pertain to the column category. Source: Own Compilation. 
